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THE CAUSES OF THE PUBLIC 
FINANCE CRASH IN THE 
SOCIALIST FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF 
YUGOSLAVIA
Sažetak
The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) was a fede-
ral state consisting of six socialist republics and two socialist au-
tonomous provinces. The self-governing form of government that 
existed in the SFRY, was based on the leading role of the League 
of Communists of Yugoslavia. Applying the hierarchical principle 
of democratic centralism, the League governed the state, including 
all the social activities, and it organized the economic activity that 
was based on the collective. Thus, the main feature of this rule was 
the absolute state-party control. The public finances were created 
by applying a very high degree of ethatization as well as the plan-
ned economy. Due to these two postulates, the public needs were 
often financed by generating inflation, or by using gray money. The 
unemployment in the SFRY was a very big problem, which was 
never solved completely.
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Introduction
The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had a labor-intensive and medium-
developed technology that featured worldwide a low accumulation, low earnings and 
a low consumption. There was an acute lack of capital for additional economic and 
social development. The Federal Executive Council1 solved the problem of the lack 
of financial capital by borrowing abroad or by issuing new money. Both solutions 
were unfavorable to the economic and social development of the Yugoslav society, 
especially to its underdeveloped republics and autonomous provinces. 
Towards the end of the seventies of the last century there were major distur-
bances in the economic life of the SFRY, the Yugoslav economy was faced with very 
large and pronounced development problems and difficulties. The emerging forms 
of major development problems and difficulties began to show in the following: the 
production stagnation, the decline in economic exchange with foreign countries; 
tightening of the balance of payments with a significant increase in external debt; 
significant problems of internal and external liquidity. One often used the primary 
money emission to cover the federal budget deficit and there were very high rates of 
inflation movements. There were noticeable problems of unemployment, especially 
of the young, qualified people, particularly in Kosovo. There was a real decline in the 
(employment income)2 payroll, the decline of personal consumption and the decline 
of social and living standards on the whole. There was a shortage of consumer goods 
on the market and many municipalities introduced coupons for coffee, oil, sugar, 
detergents etc. At the federal level, one introduced electricity reductions, motorcycle 
fuel bills, and for a time there was a car ride on the so-called „even-odd“, namely, on 
certain days of the week only the car drivers whose licence plates ended with an even 
or odd number were allowed to drive.
A direct introduction to the crisis was the death of Josip Broz Tito, after which 
SIV devalued the dinar by 30%. During his illness, the Federal Executive Council 
1 The Federal Executive Council (FEC) represented the SFRY government. It was established in 1953, 
when it took over the responsibility of the Government of the FNRY. It had a task of law enforcing, 
supervising the work of the federal administration, and carrying out other duties within the jurisdi-
ction of the Federation. It consisted of at least fifteen members elected by the SFRY Assembly. The 
presidents of the republic and provincial executive councils (republic governments) automatically 
joined the FEC. In the period until 1963, the function of the FEC President was carried by the 
President of FNRJ, by the Constitution, and as of 1963 the FEC President was elected by the SFRY 
Assembly.
2 In the SFRY instead of the term „salary“ the term „employment income“ was used and it was defined 
as a netto amount of money that a person earned by being employed.
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tried to devalue the dinar on several occasions, but it never managed to, because it 
was opposed directly by Tito. Namely, Tito thought that if one would devalue the 
dinar, this would cause  damage to the international reputation of the SFRY, which 
was important to him.
In order to stabilize the economic and social conditions in the SFRY in the sec-
ond half of the eighties of the last century, three Programme documents were issued 
to exit from the economic crisis. They were: the Long-Term Economic Stabilization 
Programme, adopted in the middle of summer 1983; the Critical Analysis Of the 
Functioning Of the Political System Of Socialist Self-Government, discussed at the 
beginning of 1986; the Proposal To Introduce Changes in the SFRY Constitution, 
filed by the SFRY Presidency at the beginning of 1987.
1. Inflationary periods in SFRY
During the SFRY’s existence, the inflationary waves were divided into five periods. 
The first period lasted from 1956 to 1962, characterized by the growth of industrial 
product prices by 1.2%, the price increase of 4.5%, the growth of the cost of living 
by 6.4%. The second period lasted from 1963 to 1966, characterized by an increase 
in industrial product prices of 7.8%, a 16% rise in retail prices, a growth of cost of 
living by 18.1%. The third period lasted from 1967 to 1975, characterized by an 
increase in industrial product prices of 11.4%, a 14.1% growth in retail prices, an 
increase in the cost of living of 14.1%. The fourth period lasted from 1976 to 1981, 
characterized by an increase in industrial product prices of 17.4%, a 21.8% growth 
in retail prices, a growth of cost of living by 21.7%. The fifth period lasted from 
1982 to 1986, characterized by an increase in the prices of industrial products by 
51.9%, the growth of retail prices by 56.3%, a rise in the cost of living of 56.3%3. 
The growth in retail prices and cost of living in the SFRY is best illustrated in Table 
No. 1. Over a period of ten years, retail prices have risen by 115 times and cost of 
living by 109 times4.
3 Marijan Korošić, Jugoslavenska kriza, Naprijed/Ekonomski institut Zagreb, Zagreb, 1989, p. 59.
4 The retail prices of industrial and agricultural products and the prices of services were recorded by 
the statisticians of the bureaus of statistics in the selected cities. The prices of industrial products 
were recorded once a month, as a rule in the five largest associated labour organizations. The prices 
of agricultural products were recorded twice a month, as a rule in the five trading organizations of 
the associated labour and in the market (2-5 markets); The prices of craft services were recorded once 
a month in three manufactures of the social (state) sector and five manufactures of the individual 
property sector. The average cost per city was calculated for each item in an unmatched arithmetic 
mean, based on the higher cost recorded at various locations in the city. For agricultural products, 
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Table no. 1 – The total index of growth in retail prices and costs of living (Ø 1987 = 100)5











Despite the numerous changes and measures taken, the beginning of 1987 did 
not go smoothly. The inflation trend continued, hence increasing the intensity of 
unfavorable economic flows, especially in the area of  production and exports, caus-
ing many disturbances in the functioning of markets and overall economic flows. For 
this reason, at the end of February 1987, the Federal Executive Council requested 
and the SFRY Assembly approved the intervention laws on the limitation of per-
sonal income payments, on the limitation of non-economic and non-productione 
investments and on limitation of the spending of resources for socio-political com-
munities and the self-governing communities of social activities. Shortly thereafter, 
in the second half of March 1987, the Federal Executive Council boosted direct state 
control of prices and even sought to return some prices to an earlier level with a pre-
determined (allocated) percentage of price increases6.
The inflation movements are best illustrated by the exchange rate of the Dinar 
against the US dollar. Namely, after the Second World War, the value of the dinar 
was determined at 1.7928 milligrams of pure gold. In the international cash flow, 
the exchange rate of the dinar was related to the US dollar: 1948, $ 1 = 50 dinars, 
1952 $ 1 = 300 dinars, 1960 $ 1 = 750 dinars; 1965 $ 1 = 1.250 dinars. During the 
economic reform in 1965, on the 24thJuly 1965, according to the provisions of the 
Law on issuance of new banknotes and coins7, the first denomination of the SFRY 
the average price from the third week was calculated (from 15th to 21st of the month). The cost of 
living index (item price index and personal consumption service) was based on a special list of items 
and personal consumption services; the average retail price of goods and services, or their individual 
price indices. For the compilation of the list and the ponder calculation one used the data from the 
survey on consumption of all non-agricultural households.
5 Cfr. Statistički godišnjak Jugoslavije za 1989. godinu, Savezni zavod za statistiku, Beograd, 1989, p. 
232-233.
6 Ibidem, p. 300-301.
7 Službeni list SFRJ, no. 33/1965.
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dinar was prformed after which a new dinar counted as one hundred old dinars. 
However, in spite of economic reform, the exchange rate of the dinars continued to 
fall, in 1973 $ 1 = 15,600 dinars; 1976 $ 1 = 18,281 dinars; 1979 
$ 1 = 19,163 dinars; 1980 $ 1 = $ 29,297; at the beginning of 1982 1 $ = 45 dinars; 
in the last quarter of 1982 1 $ = 65 dinars; and at the end of 1983 $ 1 = 125 dinars; 
at the beginning of May 1985 $ 1 = 275 dinar8s; 1986 $ 1 = 383.34 dinars; 1987 $ 
1 = 771.91 dinars; 1988. $ 1 = 2610.18 dinars9. In the period from 1981 to 1988, 
the value of the dinar denominated in US dollars was the following: 1981 1 dinar = 
0.004 $; 1982 1 dinar = 0.006 $; 1983. 1 dinar =
 $ 0.013; 1984 1 dinar = 0.021 $; 1985 1 dinar = 0.031 $; 1986 1 dinar = 0.046 $; 
1987 1 dinar = $ 0.12; 1988 1 dinar = $ 0.52110. Looking at the period from 1973 to 
1988, one can easily notice that the value of the dinar in relation to the US dollar fell 
by 167.3 times. Thus, this is the best indicator of monetary instability of the dinar 
during the SFRY’s existence.
2. External debt of SFRY
Regarding deeper understanding of the inflation trends, it is interesting to analyze 
the rise of the US dollar price over the period lasting sixty-two years. Namely, the 
change in orientation regarding the US dollar exchange rate of the period from 1926 
to 1998, can very well be understood from the Guidelines on the manner and pro-
cedure referring to the revalorization of the debt amount and the time limits for the 
debt payments in favour of the budget of the Republic of Croatia. The Guidelines 
were issued by the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Croatia11 on 12th July 
1999. 
The external debt of the SFRY had continuously increased from year to year. The 
debt amounts on the 31st December, according to the years, expressed in USD bil-
lions were as follows: 1966 = 1.18; 1973 = 3.98; 1979 = 14.01; 1980 = 17.34; 1981 
= 19.51; 1982 = 18.62; 1983 = 18.72; 1984= 18:27; 1985 = 17.98; 1986 = 18.5712; 
1986 = 20.59; 198713 = 21.96; 1988 = 20.2214.
8 Cfr. Stevan Kukoleča, Organizaciono-poslovni leksikon, Izdavačka radna organizacija „Rad“, Beo-
grad, 1986, p. 219-220.
9 Supra notae no. 5,p. 61. 
10 Statistički godišnjak Jugoslavije za 1990. godinu, Savezni zavod za statistiku, Beograd, 1990, p. 776.
11 Narodne novine, no. 77/1999.
12 Bilten Narodne banke Jugoslavije, no. 12/1984, p. 71.
13 Bilten Narodne banke Jugoslavije, no. 11-12/1989, p. 73.
14 Supra notae no. 5, p. 229.
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At the time of the dissolution of the SFRY, the external debt amounted to over $ 
23 billion, which was allocated to the successor states by the decisions of the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund Executive Committee. With regard to assets and debts, it was 
determined that 28.49% belong to the Republic of Croatia.15
Table no. 2 - The Exchange rate of SFRY Dinar on December 18, 198916
currency purchasable medium sales
AUD 1 87.75 87.89 88.02
ATS 100 917.06 918.44 919.82
CAD 1 96.34 96.48 96.63
DKK 100 1,662.22 1,664.72 1,667.22
FRF 100 1,885.49 1,888.32 1,891.15
DEM 100 6,459.96 6,469.66 6,479.37
ITL 100 8.66 8.67 8.69
CHF 100 7,194.0 7,205.1 7,216.42
GBP 1 179.29 179.55 179.82
USD 1 111.95 112.11 112.28
3. Employment rate in the SFRY
In the SFRY the unemployment represented a huge problem, which was never com-
pletely solved. While attempting to improve the social conditions in certain parts of 
the former federation, the authorities allowed the citizens to depart for the reason 
of the „temporary work abroad“, which for most Yugoslav immigrants meant the 
ultimate solution of employment but abroad. Compared to the total population, the 
figures of the unemployed were devastating.The official statistics published the fol-
lowing relevant data regarding the unemployed: 1984 = 974,787 (544,739 women 
or 55.65%)17; 1985 = 1,039,633 (578,561 women or 55.56%); 1986 = 1,086,716 
(603,823 women or 55.81%); 1987 = 1,080,587 (603,140 women or 55.65%); 
1988 = 1,131,764 (620,745 women or 54.84%); 1989 = 1,202,220 (650,772 wom-
en or 54.17%)18. Observed in relative figures, ie observing the ratio of total popu-
lation and the employed, the highest unemployment was in SAP Kosovo, and the 
smallest in SR Slovenia. Over 50% of the unemployed were women.
15 Cfr. Miljenko Brekalo, Evazija kapitalnih prihoda, Svjetla grada d. o. o., Osijek, 2004, p. 134-137.
16 Exchange rate list at Slavonska banka d.d. Osijek of 18th December 1989, Glas Slavonije, no. 
13690/1989, Osijek, of 18th December 1989, p. 20.
17 Supra notae no. 5, p. 474.
18 Supra notae no. 5, p. 467.
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4. The level of employment incomes (salary) in the SFRY
The level of inflation movements in the SFRY is well illustrated on the example of 
employment incomes, ie the salaries of employees. The pure employment income19 
per worker in dinars by years was as follows: 1983 = 15,858; 1984 = 22,810; 1985 = 
40,661; 1986 = 84,670; 1987 = 173,965; 1988 = 472,722. Considered in percent-
ages, the salary level increased nominally by 335%, but in reality, this was not the 
case, which is best seen in the US dollar exchange rate being in 1983 1 $ = 125 dinars 
and in 1988 1 $ = 2,610 dinars. Thus, the exchange rate of the dollar grew by 20.88 
times over the five-year period, and the salary bill increased only 11.62 times. For 
example, pure employment income, according to the amount per worker in dinar by 
republics and provinces in 1988 was as follows: SR Slovenia = 719,544; SR Croatia 
= 514,231; SAP Vojvodina = 452,914; Serbia = 428,011; Serbia with the provinces 
= 424,533; SR Bosnia and Herzegovina = 398,110; SR Montenegro = 345,690; SR 
Macedonia = 321,158; SAP Kosovo = 314,085. Thus, Slovenia, Croatia and Vo-
jvodina were above the Yugoslav average by the level of pure employment income, 
while the other republics and SAP Kosovo were below average. On the other hand, 
comparing the amount of pure employment income per employee at the republic 
and province level of 1988, the situation was as follows: SFRY = 100%, SR Slovenia 
= 152%, SR Croatia = 109%, SAP Vojvodina = 96%, Serbia = 91%, Serbia with the 
provinces = 90%, SR Bosnia and Herzegovina = 84%, SR Montenegro = 73%, SR 
Macedonia = 68%, SAP Kosovo = 66%. So, considering the relative figures, only 
Slovenia and Croatia were above the Yugoslav average20. 
In the SFRY there was a continuous negative balance on the trade balance sheet. 
In other words, it always had a higher import rate than the export rate; the import 
coverage was always smaller than the export, as is illustrated by table no. 3. which 
presents the analysis of imports and exports over a period of ten years21.
19 Since 1963 the data on pure employment income per employee had been obtained based on the 
regular monthly report on employees and pure incomes. Pure personal income includes the reso-
urces earned by workers in production activities, and it consists of employment income and other 
personal earnings. The pure personal income in the individual economy sector represents a part of 
the income of individual producers that remains at their disposal for the personal consumption of 
their households. The pure employment income and other personal earnings, that were charged as 
operational expenses of the business, are shown in the netto amount, ie without contributions for 
the employment income and other personal earnings. These contributions are included in the sur-
plus of the product.
20 Supra notae no. 5, p. 475.
21 The data sources for foreign trade statistics are customs declarations on export and import of go-
ods. The SFRY foreign trade statistics included exports of all the goods coming from domestic 
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1979 8,574 17,691 -9,117 48.5
1980 11,330 19,011 -7,681 59.6
1981 12,878 18,335 -5,457 70.2
1982 12,523 16,089 -3,566 77.8
1983 12,233 14,924 -2,691 82.0
1984 12,611 14,695 -2,084 85.8
1985 13,349 15,295 -1,946 87.3
1986 14,188 16,916 -2,728 83.9
1987 15,383 17,125 -1,742 89.8
1988 16,590 17,371 -781 95.5
„The year of 1989 was a year of relations breakdown. The worst relations were 
between Slovenia and Serbia. This was not a natural hostility because both republics 
had profited greatly in Yugoslavia. Serbs used Yugoslavia to unite their widespread 
population into a unified state. Slovenes used it for security and business reasons. „23
5. The Economic Stabilization Programme of 1989
The Programme that was introduced by Ante Marković24 in the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia on 18 December 1989 was a the Programme of economic 
reform and a Programme of democratization of the entire Yugoslav society. The 
production, ie from the domestic trade, including the so-called „national goods”, ie goods that were 
imported and customs cleared, and then they were exported in the unaltered state to the overseas 
market as Yugoslav goods. The import included all the goods imported from overseas, which were 
customs cleared and released for internal trade for the sake of reproduction, investments or broad 
consumption. The value of goods in foreign trade was expressed based on the prices achieved by 
the organizations of the associated labor when concluding the contract. One calculated all values 
based on the parity franco Yugoslav border: FOB price for export, CIF for import. The values  were 
calculated at the then exchange rates that were valid on the day of customs clearance. The costs for 
the transport, insurance and transhipment, etc., were calculated also at the then exchange rates, and 
they were paid in foreign currency.
22 Supra notae no. 5, p. 110.
23 Warren Zimmerman, Izvori jedne katastrofe, Globus/Znanje, Zagreb, 1997, p. 45.
24 Ante Marković (born 25th November 1924, Konjic - died 24th November 2011, Zagreb), Croatian 
businessman and a politician, graduated in electrical engineering at the University of Zagreb in 
1954. He had worked for many years at the company „Rade Končar“, where he was employed as a 
designer, a chief of research department, a technical manager assistant, a general manager assistant, 
and he was a general manager from 1961 until 1984. From 1982 until 1991 he was actively engaged 
in politics, carrying the following prominent political duties: President of the Executive Council 
of the Republic of Croatia (1982-1986), President of the Presidency of the Republic of Croatia 
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Programme included changes in politics, economy, society and citizens’ rights, and 
it anticipated several stages: a stabilization Programme, an economic reform, a pri-
vatization, a state reform and a multiparty system. According to Marković, the main 
objective of the Programme was to create large foreign currency reserves, which was 
a prerequisite for dinar convertibility; a new macroeconomic policy; monetary re-
forms; liberalization of prices and of foreign trade; reduction of general and public 
spending; inflation stop; recovery and reform of the banking system; start of the 
privatization process, etc. 
On 18th December 1989 Marković explained in detail and presented his anti-in-
flation Programme in his talk to the SFRY Assembly. According to him, as outlined 
above, the core characteristics of the model for the recovery of the economy and the 
financial system are the convertibility of the Dinar in current foreign transactions 
and the right of citizens to freely exchange dinars for foreign currencies at the of-
ficial exchange rate.The exchange rate of the Dinar was linked to the West German 
Mark, and the exchange rate was not changed until June 1990. At the same time, 
the Yugoslav Dinar was denominated, from the then ten thousand dinars to a one 
convertible dinar. Starting from the 19th December 1989, one West German mark 
was worth seven Dinars, and the US dollar twelve dinars. The normative basis of the 
second Dinar denomination in the SFRY was the Law on Changing the Value of the 
Dinar25. However, among the main features of his reform, Marković emphasized the 
strong monetary policy, the budget balanced by its very own real income and the 
free formation of the interest rate, with the corresponding role of the discount rate 
of the National Bank of Yugoslavia. According to him, the basis for the implementa-
tion of his Programme were the large foreign currency reserves that reached the level 
of 5.8 billion US dollars, the expected surplus in the state balance of payments for 
1990, as well as a strong foreign financial support. By the end of 1990, Marković 
predicted a thirteen-percent increase in prices, which would be freely formed, except 
in the infrastructure and communal services and this would happen by the end of 
June 199026. 
(1986-1988), Chairman of the Federal Executive Council of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia (16th March 1989 – 20th December 1991).
25 Službeni list SFRJ, no. 83/1989. 
26 Cfr. Glas Slavonije, no.13691/1989., Osijek, of 19th December, 1989, p.1-3.
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Table no. 2 - Exchange rate of SFRY Dinar on December 18, 198927
Currency purchasable medium sales
AUD 1 94.18 94.33 94.47
ATS 100 991.90 993.39 994.88
CAD 1 103.45 103.61 103.76
DKK 100 1,796.99 1,799.69 1,802.39
FRF 100 2,044.53 2,047.60 2,050.67
DEM 100 6,989.50 7,000.00 7,010.50
ITL 100 9.35 9.36 9.37
NLG 100 6,191.41 6,200.71 6,210.01
SEK 100 1,922.88 1,925.77 1,928.66
CHF 100 7,791.23 6,200.71 6,210.01
GBP 1 192.98 193.27 193.56
USD 1 120.21 120.39 120.58
The ideological creator of the anti-inflation Programme was an American econo-
mist Jeffrey David Sachs28, whom Marković hired, upon having been persuaded by 
Slovenian Janez Drnovšek. After the introduction of the anti-inflation Programme, 
the result was obvious; at the beginning of 1990, Marković lowered inflation to a 
zero, ie by more than twenty-five thousand per cent a year, which was the 14th larg-
est inflation in the history of mankind. In a period of less than a year, Marković had 
quadrupled the foreign currency reserves, and had begun the process of opening the 
economy for investors.29
According to Sachs, the main objective of the anti-inflation Programme was to 
suppress the then hyperinflation, and then to stabilize economic conditions that were 
extremely bad in the Federal Yugoslavia. Together with Ante Marković, he managed 
to do only the first task, ie in early 1990s they managed to stabilize the monetary 
27 Exchange rate list at Slavonska banka d.d. Osijek of 19th December 1989, Glas Slavonije, no. 
13691/1989, Osijek, of 19h December 1989, p. 20.
28 Jeffrey David Sachs (born 5th September 1954 Detroit), an American economist. From 1980, he was 
a professor of international trade at Harvard University and since 2002 he has been a professor at 
Columbian University and a director of Eart Institute. He was an economic advisor to the Internati-
onal Monetary Fund, the World Bank, UN Secretary General Kofi Annana, and to a number of La-
tin American governments. He became world-known in 1985, when he, as a 30-year-old one, made 
a Programmeeme that stopped the hyperinflation in Bolivia. This event gave him an international 
reputation in a professional sense. After the communisam had collapsed communism in Europe, he 
organized privatization in Poland and then in Russia. The Polish model was declared successful, but 
the Russian model allowed huge plundering and the emergence of the oligarch class. After a nega-
tive Russian experience, he claimed that Boris Yeljcin and a corrupt Russian administration were to 
be blamed for all. Namely, as soon as he realized what was going on, he left Russia. At the turn of 
1989/1990 he also advised the last Prime Minister of the SFRY, Ante Marković, he was one of the 
initiators of inflation reduction and the creation of a stable dinar.
29 Supra notae no. 23, p. 66.
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system, to strengthen the exchange rate against foreign currencies and to bring infla-
tion to a one-digit- level, but then there were two reasons why the reform plans were 
stopped after a short time. The first was called Slobodan Milošević whose politics 
destroyed the state, and the second was the international community that did not 
want to interfere in the internal affairs. The international community did not make 
a minimum effort to stop the disintegration process and one could not administer a 
successful economic policy under these circumstances.
As a strong indicator of the passive attitude of the international community to-
wards Marković’s efforts aimed at stabilizing the Dinar exchange rate and at revital-
izing the Yugoslav economy, one can quote the words by Warren Zimmerman, a 
former US Ambassador in Belgrade, regarding Marković’s visit to the United States 
in October 1989. „What Marković wanted more than anything was the support 
from the West. He saw the US as a crucial state. He wanted to go to Washington 
and visit President Bush. He wanted a clear statement of the US support for his 
Programme. But above all, he wanted money. How much? „Well,“ he said with an 
infectious smile, „I play a great game, and that means a lot of money. I think that 
the $ 4 billion would be a good start to boost the reform that goes further than any-
thing in the Eastern Europe.“ Swallowing with difficulty, I told him I would forward 
the request to Washington. I knew what the answer would be. American politics in 
Eastern Europe were focused on Poland and Hungary, the countries that were on the 
road of transition much faster than Yugoslavia and without the luggage of a rifting 
nationalism. Yugoslavia was seen as a worthless risk and therefore of low priority.
Marković finally travelled to Washington in October 1989. I lobbied hard for 
this visit. With the help of Eagleburger and the State Department’s European Office, 
the White House agreed to arrange a meeting with President Bush, Defense Minister 
Cheney, Treasury Secretary Brady and Foreign Trade Minister Mosbacher, as well as 
to schedule a visit to Congress and a visit to New York for the talks with bankers and 
business people. I watched Marković at all his meetings, and I could notice that he 
was confused by the way Washington treated foreign dignitaries. Like many leaders 
of small countries, he was looking forward to the attention, the proper respect and 
the generous hospitality – a guest apartment, an official car, lunches and dinners in 
his honor, all the follow-up in the American press. He did not get any of that. The 
US government did not pay any cent for his visit. In fact, the only bill Marković did 
not have to pay was a round table with breakfast at the New York Foreign Affairs 
Council ...“30
30 Supra notae no. 23, p. 64-65. 
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Marković’s Programme was supported by the whole SFRY. It was only Milošević, 
who was against him, namely, he demanded that the delegates in the SFRY As-
sembly who were from Serbia, Vojvodina, Kosovo and Montenegro vote against the 
Programme, saying on that occasion: „We should not allow Ante Marković to pass 
with this Programme, because it will be hard to get rid of him later.“31 “Milošević 
was forcing Serbian delegates not to accept all the points of the Programme. For 
Milošević, the Programme had been an obstacle to his efforts to gain the absolute 
power in Yugoslavia. The introduction of a multiparty system and elections in Yu-
goslavia would prevent Milošević from remaining in power. Serbia and Slovenia op-
posed the Yugoslav elections. Slovenia did it because of separatism, and Serbia, ie 
Milošević, dit it because of its Greater Serbia ambitions. „32 Liberalization of political 
and economic conditions in Yugoslavia did not suit Milošević, at all cost he tried 
to hinder the success of the economic and political reform Marković was trying to 
implement. In the case of Marković’s success, his Programme would be condemned 
to failure, the aroused nationalism and chauvinism in Serbia would be condemned 
to ruin, and hence the idea of  a Greater Serbia.
The failure of Marković’s Programme could be anticipated at the end of the first 
year of its existance, which could best be concluded from his talk at the SFRY As-
sembly on 28th December 1990. On that day he stated the following: „It does not 
matter whether we go on together or individually, whether we will remain within one 
state or not, whether there is one or another political system, prevailing in this or that 
part of our country. It is not possible to skip the problems of the transition period, 
of the transition from one system to another one, at all the economic, social and at 
the political costs that have to be paid.33“ On that occasion, Marković announced 
the correction of the foreign exchange rate of the Dinar, namely, on 27th December 
1990, the Federal Executive Council passed the decision that as of 1st January 1991 
the West German Mark was worth nine dinars, two dinars more than in 1990.
According to Marković, such an alteration of the exchange rate was the optimal 
solution, as it balanced the export incentive with the possibility of depreciating the 
price shock and thereby preserving the relative price stability. The Federal Executive 
Council had to make decisions blocking the transactions in the foreign exchange 
market, as the foreign reserves since September 1990, when they amounted to about 
ten billion US dollars, had been reduced by two and a half billion dollars, out of 
31 Cfr. Borisav Jović, Poslednji dani SFRJ, Vlastita naklada, Beograd, 1996; p.17-18.
32 Srušite reforme, srušite Markovića, Vjesnik, br. 20086/2003, Zagreb, of 30th October 2003, p. 7.
33 Glas Slavonije, no. 14008/1990, Osijek, of 29th December 1990, p. 1
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which a billion and a half just in December. Marković saw the cause of these occur-
rences in the fact that companies did not bring foreign currencies into Yugoslavia 
because they were waiting for the alteration of the exchange rate in anticipated pay-
ments abroad, in order to pay for everything they could at the lowest exchange rate 
possible. The second cause was also the fact that the citizens themselves were buying 
more foreign currency. The ratio of inflows and outflows of foreign currencies be-
longing to citizens, having reached about one hundred and seventy million dollars 
by the end of September 1990, then amounted to two billion and seven hundred 
million dollars.34 
After the January’s alteration of the exchange rate of the Dinar, one anicipated 
the economic collapse which was an additional generator of the political crisis in 
Yugoslavia, and in the mid-1991 it was also a direct introduction to the war events 
in the territory of the Republic of Slovenia and the Republic of Croatia. The table 
no. 5 shows the foreign exchange rate of the Yugoslav Dinar after the devaluation of 
1st January 1991.
Table no. 5 - The foreign exchange rate of the SFRY Dinar after the devaluation of 1st January 
199135.
Currency purchasable medium sales
AUD 1 1.32 10.35 10.38
ATS 100 126.88 127.26 127.65
CAD 1 11.55 11.58 11.62
DKK 100 231.13 321.82 232.52
FRF 100 263.11 263.90 264.69
DEM 100 987.30 900.00 902.70
ITL 100 11.9 1.19 1.19
NLG 100 795.34 797.74 800.13
SEK 100 236.84 235.56 238.27
CHF 100 1,052.24 1,055.41 1,058.57
GBP 1 25.83 25.91 25.98
USD 1 13.40 13.44 13.48
While giving his testimony in the war crime trial of Slobodan Milošević at the In-
ternational Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in the Hague, Ante Marković 
stated the fact-based actions of Milošević’s regime that were directed against anti-
inflationary and other measures taken by the then Federal Government. Among 
34 Ibidem, p. 5. 
35 Exchange rate list at Slavonska banka d.d. Osijek of 1st January 1991, Glas Slavonije, no. 
1¸4009/1990, Osijek, of 31st December 1990/ 1st&2nd January 1991, p 32.
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other things, Milošević took the following measures: on 20th December 1989, he 
had a one-and-a-half-hour strike against the Programme held in Belgrade. At the 
same time, in order to endanger the Programme, the salaries in Serbia were increased, 
although the salary freeze was one of the core ideas of the Programme. Milošević also 
organized the opposition to the Programme of economic stabilization at the sessions 
of the Assembly of SR Serbia and of the Executive Council of SR Serbia, that were 
both closed to the public.36 37
„In order to carry out the reform, all the republics needed to give their support. 
It is enough to to say that the governments of Serbia and of Vojvodina publicly op-
posed the reforms and democratization. The success of reforms and democratization 
in the country, after multi-party elections in Yugoslavia, would mean Milošević’s loss 
of every opportunity to keep Yugoslavia under his control applying his undemocratic 
methods. If I had gotten the support for my Programme, I think Slovenia would not 
have had any reason to secede from the federation. Due to the extremely successful 
parts of the Programme, which included economic reform, my popularity was at a 
very high level at the beginning of 1990. According to the survey results, my status 
was better than Kučan’s in Slovenia or Milosević’s in Serbia. If the elections had been 
held at that time, nobody could have defeated me. Slobodan Milošević did not allow 
such popularity as it was an obstacle to his plans. As a result of economic reforms, 
inflation was at zero point; we had eleven billion dollars in foreign exchange reserves; 
the balance of payments was positive; during the first year of my term, sixty-five 
thousand private companies were founded; the debt was reduced from $ 21 billion 
to $ 12.2 billion. Opposing the Programme, Serbia claimed that the rich parts of 
the SFRY would become even richer, and the poor ones would be even poorer. That 
was not the truth. The SFRY had financed Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, 
Montenegro and Kosovo, and had taken over part of their international obligations 
in order to facilitate the reforms38.39
In addition, Serbia argued that the federal government would not support 
the agrarian sector because it had abolished primary emissions for this purpose. 
36 The Vjesnik, Zagreb daily newspaper, published a series of parts of Ante Marković’s testimony in 
the war crimes trial of Slobodan Milošević at the International Criminal Tribunal in the Hague, 
titled „What Ante Marković said testifying at the Hague trial of Slobodan Milošević. The series was 
published in sixteen-part series, in the period from 30th October 2003 until 15th November 2003. 
37 The Globus, the weekly magazine no. 673/2003, Zagreb, of 31st October, 2003, p. 18-26. 
38 Supra notae no. 23, p. 53-54. 
39 Narodna banka Srbije 1990. opljačkala je iz NBJ dvije i pol milijarde maraka, Što je Ante Marković 
rekao svjedočeći na Haaškom suđenju Slobodanu Miloševiću; Vjesnik, no. 20088/2003, Zagreb, of 
2nd November 2003, p. 5.
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However, it was envisaged that the financial support for agriculture would come 
from the budget, rather than from primary emissions, as it had been the case be-
fore. The prices of agricultural products had not risen - not only had we had large 
foreign currency reserves, but we had also had great reserves of wheat, corn, sugar, 
oil, etc. which we could have placed on the market in order to control the prices. In 
addition, I tried to put an end to the practice of exporting the SFRY goods to the 
Soviet Union without payment. The National Bank of Yugoslavia (NBJ) had the 
authority to make payments to SFRY companies without checking whether Soviet 
companies paid for the exported goods. (This was another form of primary emission 
or money printing.) I tried to stop this practice because it led to the buildup of the 
debt of the USSR (which at that time amounted to $ 2.8 billion) to Yugoslavia, thus 
directly influencing the inflation growth. I tried to stop this practice by asking that 
the National Bank of Yugoslavia (NBJ) to submit the payment confirmations before 
the NBJ itself made a payment. This led to the fact that the clearing dollar exchange 
rate was lower than the real exchange rate of the dollar, and this referred to all the 
companies in Yugoslavia.40
Milošević had control over almost half of Yugoslavia, but despite his attempts to 
obstruct and sabotage the reforms, during the first year the reforms were remark-
ably successful and promising. Public spending was put under control and it moved 
within the budget without the use of funds from the primary emission. This meant 
that the JNA expenditures were also put under control. These circumstances and the 
upcoming elections in Serbia and Montenegro made Milošević break through the 
monetary system and commit the „plunder of the century“. This attack was sup-
posed to stop the process of reforms and democratization and to weaken the already 
diminished powers of the federal government. The plunder in which the RSD 18.2 
billion (DEM 2.5 billion) was transferred from the National Bank of Yugoslavia to 
the Serbian National Bank was carried out overnight, which was reported to me by 
my men privately the very same morning and I did not receive any official notifica-
tion whatsoever.
I immediately phoned Milošević and accused him of the robbery, which he de-
nied, of course, lying that he had no idea about it and that he would investigate the 
matter. I replied that nothing in Serbia, no matter how insignificant it would be, 
could be accomplished without his knowledge, and, in particular, not the robbery of 
that size. I asked him to immediately cancel this decision (the move), which he also 
„promised“ to do, provided the robbery was true. On the very same day I summoned 
40 Supra notae no. 31, p. 22-24.
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the government session and obliged the NBJ to make a refund. As far as I remember, 
ten to eleven billion dinars were returned within two to three weeks. That means that 
seven to eight billion dinars or one billion DEM were not returned.41
6. The Last Budget of the SFRY of 1991
The SFRY budget of 1991 was established at the end of 1990. This budget was set 
up by the same same principles as the 1989 budget for the budget of 1990. Howe-
ver, the events changed the situation. The financial difficulties returned inevitably, 
especially after Slovenia and Serbia, and then Croatia, refused to pay taxes to the 
Federal Budget. In the second half of 1991, the federal budget collapsed. We had a 
financial deficit for which there was no cover, and the debts grew. In the government 
they kept me away and denied me the information. One began to make decisions on 
finances without my knowledge or consent. I opposed the use of primary emissions 
to finance the budget, on the other hand, Milošević supported the financing of the 
budget from primary emissions.
In the second half of 1991, Milošević was in fact controlling the rebalancing of 
the federal budget by controlling the representatives of the Federal Assembly and the 
Federal Presidency. In December 1991, the 1992 SFRY budget was being prepared, 
but without me. That was a war budget. According to this budget, about 81% of 
funds were to be allocated for JNA expendetures. I tried to fight against this in the 
government, but I, for the first time, remained completely alone attempting to do 
that. I had no support whatsoever. I did not stand a chance to succeed. I did not 
want to take part in the bloodshed that would, of course, follow the adoption of this 
budget. Therefore, on 20th December 1991, I resigned. I informed cca. 200-300 
journalists about my decision and flew via Graz to Zagreb.42
The military budget was part of the SFRY budget. The military budget was first 
prepared by the Federal Secretariat for Defense, and then the Federal Government 
adjusted it and included it in the overall budget. Then the Presidency was informed 
about the overall budget. The final decision on the budget was made by the Federal 
Assembly. When the 1991 budget was being prepared at the end of 1990, the Gov-
ernment and I still had control over the preparations for the budget set up. That 
was not the case later on. The Council of Governors of the NBJ made a decision on 
primary emissions as well as in the cases when these were used to finance the federal 
41 Supra notae no. 31, p. 25.
42 Supra notae no. 31, p. 214-215.
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budget deficit. The Council of Governors existed before the fall of the SFRY. It con-
sisted of the governors of the National Bank of all six republics and two autonomous 
provinces.
The Council of Governors functioned the same way as the Presidency of the 
SFRY - some of the decisions were made on the basis of majority votes, while some 
other decisions required the consent of all the representatives. In order to make a 
decision on the primary emissions one required the consent of the Council of Gover-
nors. Milošević had no influence on the decisions made by the Council of Governors 
in 1989 and in 1990. That changed in the second half of 1991. Milošević had his 
own men in the Council of Governors. The Council of Governors then functioned 
the same way as the SFRY Presidency, because the Governors of the republics of the 
National Bank left the Council. The NBJ was supposed to function as an independ-
ent institution, but by the end of 1991 it was under Milošević’s supervision.43“
Conclusion
The inflation movements were one of the main features of the Yugoslav economy. In 
the SFRY from 1946 to 1991, the money stock grew faster than the growth of the 
social product and the national income, at the same time the exchange rate of Dinar 
recorded a constant and significant decline compared to other currencies.
The use of a new money supply proved to be a very effective means of fostering 
the Yugoslav state’s income, and at the same time, it is worth pointing out that it had 
proved to be a dangerous tool. The new money supply had a negative impact on the 
economic stability of the country, inducing a powerful inflationary wave. In other 
words, using the primary money supply to cover the budget deficit meant to generate 
inflation on purpose, and this inflation got out of control so the burden of financing 
public needs had been shifted to the citizens.
The main objective of Marković’s anti-inflation Programme was to suppress the 
then hyperinflation of that time, and then to stabilize the economic conditions that 
were so poor in the SFRY. Ante Marković managed to realize the first task, ie in the 
beginning of 1990, he managed to stabilize the monetary system, to strengthen the 
exchange rate against foreign currencies and to bring the inflation to a one-digit 
level, but then there were two reasons why the reform plans were soon stopped. The 
first one was called Slobodan Milošević, whose politics destroyed the state, and the 
43 Supra notae no. 39, p. 5-6.
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second reason was the international community that did not want to interfere in 
the internal affairs. The international community did not make a minimum effort 
to stop the disintegration processes, and under these circumstances one could not 
conduct a successful economic policy.
The SFRY budget of 1991 was established at the end of 1990 having been set 
up by the same principles as the budget of 1990. The political events changed the 
situation, the financial difficulties returned inevitably, especially after Slovenia and 
Serbia, and then Croatia, refused
to pay taxes to the Federal Budget, which collapsed in the second half of 1991, 
when a large budget deficit emerged without cover, the state debts continued to grow 
towards foreign creditors. In the SIV, the supporters of the Greater Serbias policy 
denied Marković the information; the decisions on financing the public needs at the 
federal level were being made without his knowledge. Marković opposed the use of 
primary emissions as a means of budget funding, whereas Milošević, on the other 
hand, supported the financing of the budget from primary emissions, which he fi-
nanced the war in Slovenia and Croatia from. In the second half of 1991, Milošević 
controlled the rebalancing of the SFRY Budget by controlling representatives of the 
SFRY Assembly and the SFRY Presidency. In the autumn of 1991, the disintegra-
tion of the SFRY occurred, the former federal republics became independent states, 
which were recognized internationally by the end of 1991 and at the beginning of 
1992.
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UZROCI FINANCIJSKOG SLOMA U 
SOCIJALISTIČKOJ FEDERALNOJ REPUBLICI 
JUGOSLAVIJI
Sažetak
Socijalistička Federativna Republika Jugoslavija (SFRJ) bila je savezna država koja se sastojala od 
šest socijalističkih republika i dvije socijalističke autonomne pokrajine. Samoupravni oblik vlasti 
koji je postojao u SFRJ, temeljio se na vodećoj ulozi Saveza komunista Jugoslavije. Primjenju-
jući hijerarhijsko načelo demokratskog centralizma, Liga je upravljala državom, uključujući sve 
društvene aktivnosti i organizirala je gospodarsku aktivnost koja se temeljila na kolektivu. Dakle, 
glavna značajka ove vladavine bila je apsolutna kontrola države i stranke. Javne financije nastale 
su primjenom vrlo visokog stupnja etatizacije kao i planirane ekonomije. Zbog ova dva postulata, 
javne potrebe često su se financirale stvaranjem inflacije ili korištenjem sivog novca. Nezaposlenost 
u SFRJ bila je vrlo velik problem koji nikada nije u potpunosti riješen.
Ključne riječi: SFRJ; inflacija; hiperinflaciju; javni dug; vanjski dug; sive emisije; ekonomska 
stabilizacija.

